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This paper examines the effects of agglomeration economies (AE) on the sensitivity of firm 
location to tax differentials. An initial reading of the story suggests that, with AE, when a firm 
moves into a community attracted by a tax reduction, other firms may decide to move in as 
well. This suggests that AE increase the sensitivity of firm location to local taxes. However, a 
second version of the story reads that, if economic activities are highly concentrated in space, 
AE might offset any tax differential, hence suggesting a reduction in this sensitivity. This 
paper provides a theoretical model of intraregional firm location with Marshallian AE that is 
able to generate both hypotheses: AE increase (decrease) the effect of taxes when locations 
are (are not) of a similar size. We then use Spanish municipal data for the period 1995-2002 
to test these hypotheses, analyzing the combined effect of local business taxes and 
Marshallian  AE on the intraregional location of employment. In line with the theory, a 
municipality with stronger AE experiences lower (higher) tax effects if it is sufficiently 
dissimilar (similar) to its neighbors in terms of size.  
JEL Code: R3, H32. 
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  When firms are mobile across jurisdictions and business taxation is decentralized, a 
government that raises its tax rate risks triggering an outflow of economic activity. In fear of 
reducing its tax base, a government might set a tax rate that is too low and, as a result, there 
might be an underprovision of local public goods. This is the so-called race to the bottom 
result which has been highlighted in the tax competition literature
1. Several factors can affect 
the sensitivity to taxes on the part of firms and, as a result, the intensity of tax competition. 
One such factor is mobility. A government whose tax base is made up of firms that are 
intrinsically attached to its jurisdiction can afford to neglect the impact of taxes on the size of 
its tax base. Another factor are agglomeration economies (AE). By AE we refer to any 
mechanism that drives economic agents to locate close to each other. A first story suggests 
that, in the presence of AE, economic activities can be quite responsive to tax differentials 
(White, 1998). Suppose a jurisdiction in which taxes are being cut. At first it will attract a 
number of firms. This larger tax base means higher AE and, thus, other firms may decide to 
move into the same jurisdiction (Story 1). This suggests that AE could increase the sensitivity 
of firm location to local taxes. However, a second story suggests that, if economic activities 
are concentrated in a single jurisdiction to begin with, AE may imply lower effects of taxes. 
This occurs because AE ensure that one jurisdiction is a much better place to run a business 
and these effects will generally offset any tax differential (Story 2). Hence, depending on the 
specific context, AE can imply higher or lower effects of taxes.  
At the theoretical level, the effect of AE on the intensity of tax competition has been 
addressed from two perspectives, which in their turn have generated different predictions 
regarding the sensitivity of firm location to taxes. Adopting the first perspective are papers by 
Boadway et al. (2004), Burbidge et al. (2004) and González (2005) which extend the Basic 
Tax Competition Model (BCTM) by considering Marshallian AE. In this case, the 
productivity of local firms increases with the scale of the local economy. Burbidge et al. 
(2004) and González (2005) explicitly address the role of AE in the sensitivity of economic 
activities to taxes. They find that AE increase tax effects and, as a result, exacerbate tax 
competition. The intuition behind Story 1 is thus stressed in this strand of the literature.  
Adopting the second perspective are papers that study tax competition by using New 
Economic Geography models (NEG). Market access and the cost of living effect constitute 
                                                 
1 See Wilson (1999) for a review of the tax competition literature. 
  2the agglomerative forces in NEG models
2. If these effects are strong enough, then a Core-
Periphery equilibrium (C-P) arises. In a C-P equilibrium, before-tax profits in the core are 
higher than those in the periphery
3. This means that small changes in tax rates may have no 
effect on the allocation of economic activities. Borck and Pflüger (2006) extend this literature 
by considering tax competition in an NEG model where partial and stable C-P equilibria may 
arise. In this setting, the periphery will always host a number of firms and mobility ensures 
that after-tax profits are equal across regions. Small tax changes will, thus, cause some firms 
to change location. It turns out that this effect decreases with the strength of AE (Story 2). 
However, in NEG models, when AE are not strong enough to sustain a C-P equilibrium, a 
diversified equilibrium arises instead. In this case the prediction of the model is reversed, that 
is, stronger AE result in taxes having a higher effect (taking us back once more to Story 1). 
Hence, NEG models predict that AE reduce the effect of taxes if jurisdictions differ 
sufficiently in size and increase the effect of taxes between jurisdictions of a similar size. 
Whatever the case, it is the C-P equilibrium that has received the bulk of the attention in the 
NEG framework and, as a consequence of this, this literature has stressed the result that AE 
decrease the effect of taxes (Story 2). 
As discussed above, the intensity of tax competition is determined by the degree to 
which firms react to taxes, which is, in the end, an empirical question. A number of studies 
have aimed to test and quantify the effect of taxes on the location of economic activities. 
Bartik (1991), in reviewing early evidence from the US, concludes that local and regional 
taxes matter to some extent. More recent contributions have generally corroborated this 
result
4. However, empirical studies examining how the interplay between AE and taxes 
shapes the spatial distribution of economic activities remain scarce
5. Devereux et al. (2007), 
in an analysis of the effectiveness of a subsidy aimed at encouraging plants to locate in 
economically depressed UK regions, found that effectiveness increased with the number of 
                                                 
2 See Baldwin et al. (2003) for more details on the workings of NEG models. 
3 The difference in before-tax profits constitutes an agglomeration rent which can be taxed by the core 
government. Papers that stress this result include Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), 
Anderson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). 
4 Recent evidence from the US indicating that local and regional taxes do matter can be found in Hines 
(1996), Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), Mark et al. (2000) and Haughwout et al. (2004). Non-US 
evidence suggesting similar conclusions includes Feld and Kirchgässner (2002) and Brülhart et al. 
(2007) for Switzerland, Buettner (2003) for Germany, Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2003) and 
Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2007) for Spain. 
5A related study is Carlsen et al. (2005), who examine the effect of mobility on local taxes. Norwegian 
municipalities whose tax base is made up of relatively mobile industries were found to set lower tax 
rates, ceteris paribus. 
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that different industries exhibit different degrees of AE, tested whether or not firms belonging 
to industries in which AE are particularly intense are less sensitive to tax differentials. They 
addressed the question by examining the impact of local corporate tax rates on plant births 
across Swiss municipalities. They found that those firms belonging to industries exhibiting a 
relatively high Ellison-Glaeser index (1997), a well-established measure of AE, were less 
responsive to tax differentials. Charlot and Paty (2007) examined the existence of a taxable 
agglomeration rent created by a market access effect, by testing the hypothesis that 
governments with access to high demand set higher tax rates. Their empirical analysis, 
conducted using French municipal data, concluded that municipalities which are 
geographically closer to high total income set higher taxes on business activities. 
Note, however, that all these papers are versions of Story 2 (i.e., AE reduce sensitivity 
to local taxes) while the theoretical discussion above suggests that this might not be the case 
in all instances. The objective of this paper is to shed some extra light on the effect AE might 
have on the sensitivity of economic activities to taxes at the empirical level, but allowing for 
both versions of the story: i.e., that AE may decrease or increase the effect of taxes depending 
on the specific case in question. To this end, we first provide a theoretical model of 
intraregional firm location which is able to generate both hypotheses. The model is a 2-
jurisdiction, 2-input and 1-good with Marshallian AE borrowed from Fujita and Thisse 
(2002) and extended here to account for local tax differentials. We find that the results of the 
interplay between AE and taxes obtained in an NEG model also hold in a model with 
Marshallian AE. In other words, AE result in an increase in the effect of taxes among 
jurisdictions that are similar in size and a reduction in these effects among jurisdictions that 
differ in size. 
We use Spanish municipal data for the period 1995-2002 to analyze the combined effect 
of the local business tax and Marshallian AE on the intraregional location of employment. 
This empirical set-up determines our modeling strategy in two ways. First, it determines the 
nature of the AE being considered. Fujita and Thisse (2002) consider that geographical 
agglomerations such as cities and highly specialized industrial and scientific districts are best 
explained by Marshallian AE, whereas market access and cost of living effects are better 
candidates for explaining agglomerations at a much larger geographical scale (e.g. 
“Manufacturing Belt” in the US or the “Blue Banana” in Europe). Therefore, here, we 
consider agglomerations at the municipal level as being driven by Marshallian AE. Second, 
  4we consider competition between municipalities that are geographic neighbors (insomuch as 
they belong to the same local labor market). This responds to the idea that taxes matter at a 
small geographic scale. Bartik (1991) stresses the fact that studies conducted at the intra-
metropolitan level have generally produced larger estimates of the effects of taxes than those 
conducted at the inter-regional level. The underlying intuition is that neighboring 
municipalities are closer substitutes. First, municipalities that are neighbors share many of the 
same attributes, e.g. wages, quality of labor force and transportation facilities. Second, 
entrepreneurs and workers may be attached to a particular area and, therefore, mobility is 
higher between neighboring municipalities.  
Our empirical analysis is carried out using a panel of municipalities in the Spanish 
region of Catalonia for the period 1995-2002. The policy instrument we focus on is the local 
business tax (Impuesto sobre actividades económicas) which has been reported to affect 
employment (Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2003) and firm location (Jofre-Monseny & 
Solé-Ollé, 2007). Our main goal is to analyze how the effect of the local business tax rate on 
municipal employment varies with AE and dissimilarity measures of the municipality. The 
level of AE is measured using variation in the strength of AE across industries and variation 
across municipalities in the industry mix. The econometric analysis takes into account the 
potential endogeneity of the tax rate and uses instrumental variables to estimate the equation. 
The selection of the instrument benefits from a specific legal trait of the Spanish local 
business tax. The law fixes maximum tax rates which vary discretely across municipalities 
according to population size, and which can be used as an exogenous source of variation in 
tax rates to produce instrumental variable estimates of the effects of interest.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical 
framework that models the effects of local taxes on the location of firms in the presence of 
AE. The empirical exercise is conducted in Section 3. Section 3.1 introduces the empirical 
specification. In section 3.2 we describe the data and variables. In section 3.3 we report and 
discuss ordinary least squares results, while instrumental variables results are dealt with in 
section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we discuss some robustness checks. Section 4 concludes. 
2.-The model. 
2.1.-The economy. 
The underlying economy is borrowed from Fujita and Thisse (2002, pp 270-278), 
although some of its variables are given a different interpretation here. There is a region with 
  5two communities: A and B. We consider two inputs. Entrepreneurs (E) are perfectly mobile 
and their number is normalized to one, i.e. EA+EB=1. L is a perfectly immobile input. Given 
that this analysis concerns jurisdictions which are not self-contained labor markets, this is best 
interpreted as land area. The price of the only output in the economy, Y, is assumed to be 
unity in both jurisdictions given the absence of trade costs. Output is produced under the 
following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
                                                                           [1]  A, B j L E E Y j j j j = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
− for              ) exp(
1 α α γ
where j indexes the jurisdiction. Productivity increases with the number of entrepreneurs that 
locate in j due to Marshallian AE.  γ  pins down the intensity of these AE, whose precise 
nature is left unspecified. 
The return of the immobile factor,  , equals its marginal productivity:  j R
                                                                   [2]  A,B  j L E E R j j j j = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − =
− for            ) exp( ) 1 (
α α γ α
Hence, the share of output that accrues to entrepreneurs and their return are: 
                                                                  [3]  A,B j L E E E r j j j j j = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅
− for              ) exp(
1 α α γ α
                                                                        [4]  A,B j L E E r j j j j = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
− − for            ) exp(
1 1 α α γ α
Migration of entrepreneurs, dEA, is assumed to be driven by the difference in log profits 
which amounts to: 
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Equilibrium requires no migration of entrepreneurs,  0 = A dE , which can only occur with 
. This model has two equilibrium regimes: the diversified and the partially 
agglomerated equilibrium regimes. The emergence of one or the other depends on the relative 
strength of agglomerative and dispersive forces. Marshallian AE lead firms to co-localize in 
space and this is the sole agglomerative force in this model. Dispersion forces stem from the 
fact that the immobile factor (L) shows decreasing returns to scale 
B A r r =
1 ) 1 ( < −α . The diversified 
equilibrium regime arises whenever  ) 1 ( 2 α γ − ⋅ < . If this inequality holds with the opposite 
sign, then the partially agglomerated regime equilibrium occurs. Note that this condition 
reveals that for an agglomerated equilibrium to arise, AE have to be large enough in 
comparison to the share of output that accrues to the immobile input. Figure 1 plots    A dE
  6against  EA for the agglomerated and the diversified equilibrium regimes in the particular 
instance that  .  B A L L =
 
Figure 1. Diversified and agglomerated equilibria in the absence of taxes. 



















In the diversified equilibrium regime, there is a unique stable equilibrium which is 
symmetric in this particular case (E in Figure 1). In the partially agglomerated equilibrium 
regime, there are three equilibria but only the asymmetric ones are stable (E´ and E´´ in Figure 
1). The core is the jurisdiction that ends up with the highest share of entrepreneurs. In the 
partially agglomerated equilibrium regime, we assume that A is the core and B is the 
periphery.  
 
2.2.-Taxes and the allocation of entrepreneurs. 
We introduce local taxation in the model. In particular, entrepreneurs are asked to pay a 
share  j τ  of their income in the jurisdiction in which they settle. The migration equation 
amounts now to the difference in log after-tax profits: 
Diversified regime Agglomerated regime
E '' E E '
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where  T  is defined as the following tax gap: T= )) 1 /( ) 1 ln(( A B τ τ − − . Equilibrium requires 
now that   which can only occur with  0 = −T dEA B B r ⋅ − A A r = ⋅ − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( τ τ . Totally 
differentiating expression   with respect to  0 = −T dEA A τ  yields the equilibrium outflow of 
entrepreneurs following a tax increase in jurisdiction A: 
                                                   
) /( ) 1 ( 2














                                              [7] 
where    is nothing but the slope of dEA. In any stable equilibrium, 
raising the tax rate in jurisdiction A must decrease the number of entrepreneurs in this 
jurisdiction. This means that for EA to be a stable equilibrium,  dEA has to be negatively 
sloped. In a diversified regime, dEA is negatively sloped for all EA (See A.1 in the Annex). In 
a partially concentrated equilibrium, this means that when 
) /( ) 1 ( 2
2
A A E E − − + α γ
γ  is very large in comparison to 
) 1 ( α − , then it has to be the case that  .  1 → A E
We now examine the effect of AE on the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials, 
i.e.  () γ τ d d dE d A A / . This can be analyzed by looking at the slope of dEA. In particular, note 
that: 
                            {} ( ) { } γ α γ γ τ d E E d sign d d dE d sign A A A A ) /( ) 1 ( 2 ) / (
2 − − + − =                     [8] 
The  derivative  ( ) γ α γ d E E d A A ) /( ) 1 ( 2
2 − − +  consists of a direct and an indirect effect: 
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whe
 
re  γ d dEA  denotes the equilibrium outflow of entrepreneurs following an increase in the 
strength of AE and it has been obtained by totally differentiating equation  0 = −T dEA  with 
respect to γ : 
) /( ) 1 ( 2












                                                                                                        [10] 
In the diversified symmetric equilibrium equation [10] is zero and the indirect effect 
vanishes. Since there is the same number of entrepreneurs in both jurisdictions, an increase in 
the strength of AE does not alter the allocation of entrepreneurs. This implies that in such 
equilibrium, an increase in the strength of AE always increases the sensitivity of 
  8entrepreneurs to taxes. The underlying intuition is that which is stressed in the literature that 
has introduced Marshallian externalities in the BCTM framework. Following a rise in taxes, 
some of the entrepreneurs that were initially found in A will move to B. The fact that some 
entrepreneurs have left A makes this location less attractive, due to the loss of technological 
externalities, and increases the number of entrepreneurs who are willing to move out. 
In any asymmetric equilibrium where  2 / 1 > A E , an increase in the strength of AE also 
increases the equilibrium number of entrepr  jurisdiction A, i.e.  eneurs in 0 > γ d dEA . Since 
the slope of dEA decreases in EA for any 2 / 1 > A E , the indirect effect wi ive and 
hence will counterbalance the direct effect. In some instances the indirect effect will 
dominate. Suppose that most of the entrepreneurs are already found in jurisdiction A,  1 → A E . 
In such an instance, remaining in jurisdiction B is only profitable because the sca f 
entrepreneurs in this jurisdiction has increased their return. But this return is highly sensitive 
to the arrival of new entrepreneurs
ll be negat
rcity o
6. Hence, in a setting where  1 → A E , an increase in the 
strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax diffe s. The reason is that 
as  A E  increases, the number of entrepreneurs that jurisdiction B can absorb while keeping 
B B A r r ⋅ − = ⋅ − ) 1 ( ) 1 (
rential
A τ τ  decreases at a very fast rate. These intuitions are reflected in the 
ose analytical details are deferred to the Annex. 
Result 1: In any stable diversified equilibrium,  ) 1 ( 2
following two results wh
α γ − ⋅ < , an increase in the 
stren rs to taxes 
 equilibrium, 
gth of AE increases the sensitivity of entrepreneu if the distribution of 
entrepreneurs is sufficiently even across jurisdictions and decreases the sensitivity of 
entrepreneurs to taxes otherwise (see A.2). 
Result 2: In any stable concentrated ) 1 ( 2 α γ − ⋅ > , an increase in the 
stren (see A.3)
tax differentials if 
jurisd
                                                
gth of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to taxes  . 
To sum up, AE increase the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to 
ictions are similar to begin with, whereas they reduce this sensitivity if the economic 
activity is highly concentrated in one jurisdiction. These results parallel those obtained in the 
literature that has studied tax competition in NEG models. Result 1 may appear to contradict 
the results reported in González (2005), where it was found that the sensitivity of the mobile 
 
6  When the number of entrepreneurs in jurisdiction B approaches zero (EB 0), the return of 
entrepreneurs in B, rB, tends to infinity due to the Inada conditions. 
→
  9factor to a tax increase was always higher with AE. However, these results are obtained 
having neglected the effect of AE on the equilibrium allocation of the mobile factor
7. 
In Figures 2, 3, and 4 we illustrate how an increase in the strength of AE affects the 
impact of a given positive tax gap, T, on the allocation of entrepreneurs. Figure 2 depicts the 
case where a stable diversified symmetric equilibrium occurs. As can be observed, the 
stronger AE are, the larger the delocation of entrepreneurs is (E´´-E is larger than E´-E). 
Figure 3 deals with the case where, although a stable diversified equilibrium emerges, the 
endowment of land area makes jurisdiction A a much better location for running a business. In 
this case, stronger AE lead to smaller outflows of entrepreneurs (E´´´-E´´ is smaller than E-
E´). Figure 4 deals with the case where a concentrated equilibrium emerges. In this case, it is 
also easily seen that stronger AE lead to smaller sensitivity to taxes on the part of firms. 
 
Figure 2.  The effect of an increase in the strength of AE on the sensitivity of 



















                                                 
7 Burbidge et al. (2004) study tax competition in the presence of both AE and heterogeneity. They 
only comment on the impact of AE on the effects of taxes in the symmetric equilibrium. 
  10Figure 3. The effect of an increase in the strength of AE on the sensitivity of 
entrepreneurs to tax differentials in a diversified equilibrium where 













Figure 4. The effect of an increase in the strength of AE on the sensitivity of 
entrepreneurs to tax differentials in a concentrated equilibrium where 
















  112.3.-Testable predictions. 
Our theoretical results are derived in a 2-jurisdiction, 2-input and 1-good framework. 
This implies that meaningful testable predictions do not follow strictly from the results of the 
model. In our view, the main message of the theoretical analysis is that the effect of AE on the 
sensitivity of economic activities to local taxes hinges on the level of similarity in size across 
competing jurisdictions. As explained above, we consider municipalities to compete more 
intensely with their neighbors. Hence, our notion of competing municipalities is that of 
neighboring municipalities. Taking this into account we posit the following two testable 
predictions: 
Testable prediction 1: A tax increase in jurisdiction i generates an outflow of economic 
activity which increases with the strength of AE in municipality i if this jurisdiction is 
sufficiently similar to its neighbors in terms of the amount of economic activity hosted. 
Testable prediction 2: A tax increase in jurisdiction i generates an outflow of economic 
activity which decreases with the strength of AE in municipality i if this jurisdiction is 
sufficiently dissimilar to its neighbors in terms of the amount of economic activity hosted. 
3.-Empirical analysis. 
3.1.-Empirical specification. 
In this paper we examine the effects of local tax rates on the location of economic 
activities in equilibrium. AE may increase or decrease the effect of taxes because when a 
plant relocates it changes profit opportunities across locations. This implies that the effects we 
are interested in are cumulative in nature. Hence, looking at the individual location decisions 
of new and re-locating establishments (e.g., as in a conditional logit framework) does not 
seem appropriate in this particular context. Therefore, we define our dependent variable as an 
aggregate measure of economic activity. This could be either the number of firms or the 
number of employees in the municipality. There are a number of factors which, in practice 
and in the case of this particular analysis, lead us to prefer employment over the number of 
firms. First, note that there is no employment in the 2-input model introduced above. Since 
labour supply does not vary across municipalities within local labour markets, movements of 
firms and employees are conceptually equivalent. Entrepreneurs choose locations on the basis 
of profit differentials and workers commute where job opportunities arise. Second, note also 
that taxes may have effects on both the extensive (plant births and re-locations) and intensive 
  12(plant contractions and production movements within multi-plant firms) margins
8, suggesting 
that the aggregate effect might be best captured by employment. Finally, employment growth 
is the main aggregate economic variable to be found in the literature on the effects of taxes on 
economic activity (see, e.g., Bartik, 1991).  
The baseline econometric model we consider is: 
                                              it t i it i it emp ε α α τ β + + + ⋅ = ) ln(                                                 [11] 
where empit denotes employment in municipality i at time t and  it τ  is the local business tax 
rate. Note that employment is measured in logs. This reflects the fact that a unit increase in 
the tax rate is likely to generate larger effects on employment levels in large municipalities 
only because tax bases are larger. Thus, our main parameter of interest  i β  measures the effect 
of the local tax rate on the percentage-change in employment.  i α  is a municipal fixed-effect 
measuring time-invariant features that make jurisdiction i suitable for running a business. 
These features may include land availability, amenities, the presence of an international 
airport or access to transportation infrastructures. This municipal fixed-effect can also reflect 
history in terms of past levels of employment.  t α  measures a year-specific effect which is 
common to all municipalities and may capture the state of the business cycle. Finally,  it ε  
denotes a year-municipal specific shock. First differencing equation [11] yields: 
                                                it t it i it u emp + + Δ ⋅ = Δ ' ) ln( α τ β                                                 [12] 
where   denotes the difference operator and  Δ k it it it u − − ≡ ε ε  k being a positive integer. Due to 
the cumulative nature of the effects of taxes, changes in employment have to be measured in a 
window of time which has to be long enough to enable the effects of interest to show up, i.e. k 
has to be large enough. Since the change in employment measured in logs is closely related to 
the employment growth rate, we use municipal employment growth to refer to our dependent 
variable.  
Our main goal is to investigate the way in which  i β  varies across municipalities. For 
that purpose we introduce a measure of the strength of AE at the municipal level,  i γ . We also 
introduce a measure of the dissimilarity in size between a jurisdiction and its neighbors,  i μ . 
We turn to the definition of these variables in the next section. Our empirical strategy relies 
                                                 
8 For example, Gobillon et al. (2007) find that taxes affect plant size (extensive margin) but not new 
plant location (extensive margin). 
  13on allowing the local tax rate effect to be a function of the AE and dissimilarity measures at 
the initial time period. We posit the following functional form for  i β : 
                                     k it k it k it i − − − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ≡ μ γ β γ β β β 3 2 1                                         [13] 
where  1 β ,  2 β  and  3 β  are parameters to be estimated. The effect of an increase in the strength 
of AE on the effect of taxes is seen by differentiating  i β  with respect to  k it− γ : 







⋅ + = μ β β
γ
β
3 2                                                   [14] 
We expect  k it− ⋅ + μ β β 3 2  to be negative when the degree of similarity between 
jurisdiction  i and its neighbors,  k it− μ , is low enough (Testable prediction 1). Instead we 
expect  k it− ⋅ + μ β β 3 2
it
 to be positive when jurisdiction i  is sufficiently dissimilar to its 
neighbors, i.e.  k − μ  is high enough (Testable prediction 2). For this to be the case  3 β  has to 
be positive ( 0 3 > β ) whereas no particular sign is expected for  2 β .  
3.2.-Data and variables 
Data: The empirical analysis is carried out with municipal data for the period 1995-
2002. The sample is restricted from the outset to the 946 municipalities of Catalonia, a region 
in north-east Spain
9. The analysis is restricted to Catalonia as employment data for this period 
are not available to researchers for all the Spanish municipalities, with the exception of the 
year 2002, which we use in some of our calculations (see below). Employment data at the 
municipal level are drawn from the Social Security Register database. These data are 
available at the 2-digit level of sectoral detail which yields 49 industries
10. Unfortunately, the 
analysis could not be carried out with all municipalities in the region due to data availability. 
Specifically, tax rates are only available for municipalities exceeding 5,000 inhabitants in 
1995, 1,000 inhabitants between 1996 and 1999 and all municipalities from 2000 onwards. 
This means that we are able to use 256 municipalities for the first period, and 419 for the 
second, making a total of 675 observations. As discussed in section 3.1, the effects we are 
looking at are cumulative and therefore we are not interested in one-year time changes. Since 
municipal elections were held in 1995 and 1999 and tax rates for year t are decided at the end 
                                                 
9 In 2002, the local business tax was reformed and from 2003 onwards municipal tax rates were no 
longer comparable with those set in previous years. 
10 The Spanish 2-digit classification (CNAE 93) currently comprises 60 industries. However, in 1995 a 
different classification was used (CNAE 74). In order to make these data comparable industries have 
to be aggregated yielding 49 economic sectors. 
  14of   we examine the two non-overlapping three-year periods, namely Dec. 1995 to Dec.  
1998 and Dec. 1999 to Dec. 2002. Hence, we use the variation in tax rates that occurred 
during the first three term-of-office years, implying  =3. In Table 1 descriptive statistics of 




Table 1. Summary statistics by sub-periods. 
  1995-1998 1999-2002 




















No. of Municipalities  256 419 
 
Local taxes: The size of Spanish municipal governments is moderate, with municipal 
budgets representing 15% of total public spending. Inter-governmental grants represent a third 
of local budgets while local taxes represent another third and the remainder consist of user 
charges. The business sector is charged a number of municipal taxes and fees. This list 
includes a local business tax, a property tax, a tax on vehicles, a tax on building activities, and 
a tax on the sale of land and buildings. Although the property tax (Impuesto sobre la 
propiedad immueble) comes first in terms of tax revenue, the local business tax (Impuesto 
sobre Actividades Económicas) is the main local tax burden borne by the business sector
12. 
Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2007) reported that the effect of the local business tax on the 
location of new establishments outweighed that of the property tax by a factor of 4. No effect 
was found for the remaining local taxes or for spending. 
The local business tax liability of each firm is based on a presumed level of profits. This 
presumed level of profits is determined by national tax laws according to input usages and the 
economic sector of the firm. This presumed level of profits is then modified at the municipal 
level at being multiplied by a municipal tax rate,  i τ . Hence, differences in business tax rates 
                                                 
11 Note that a longer window (e.g., k=6) would have impeded the control for period-specific common 
shocks, which seem to be relevant in our case (see section 3). 
12 For a more detailed description of local business taxation in Spain see Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé 
(2007). 
  15mean that firms pay different shares of their profits in different municipalities. Municipal 
governments are given quite considerable tax autonomy and local business statutory tax rates 
can vary from 0.8 to 1.9. However, the range within which municipalities can set their tax rate 
varies with population size. The maximum tax rate increases from 1.4 (<5,000 inhabitants) to 
1.6 (5,001-20,000 inhabitants), to 1.7 (20,001-50,000 inhabitants), to 1.8 (50,001-100,000 
inhabitants) and to 1.9 (>100,0000 inhabitants). In Figure 5 we plot the local business tax rate 
against population for all municipalities whose population exceeds 1,000 inhabitants in 
1999
13. Instead, the minimum tax rate is 0.8 for all municipalities. 
 
Figure 5.  Scatter plot of  business tax rates vs. population in 1999. Legal 



















Note that the variation in statutory tax rates is considerable. Note too, that the number of 
municipalities that set a tax rate that is equal to the maximum permitted by law is 36%. 
Besides, from 1996 to 2002, for municipalities with at least 1,000 inhabitants, the share of 
                                                 
13 This is the sample used in carrying out the subsequent econometric analysis. 
  16municipalities whose maximum tax rate was binding increased from 32% to 42%
14. This 
reflects the fact that local business tax rates increased over the period studied. 
The strength of AE in municipality i: We identify variation in the strength of AE across 
municipalities from two sources: 1) Variation in the strength of AE across industries; 2) 
Variation in the industry mix across municipalities. Thus, a municipality in which industries 
with high AE are over-represented is classified as a municipality with strong AE. Differences 
in the strength of AE across industries are identified from differences in the geographic 
concentration of industries. The Ellison-Glaeser agglomeration index (1997) is a well-
established measure of the geographic concentration of an industry. This index measures the 
extent to which an industry is geographically concentrated while controlling for: 1) The 
geographic concentration of the economic activity in general; 2) The fact that industries differ 
in their industrial organization
15. This index can be understood as a measure of the tendency 
of plants within an industry to co-locate in space. Therefore, it can be considered a measure of 
the strength of AE within one industry. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) also proposed a co-
agglomeration index, which computes the tendency of plants from different industries to co-
locate in space. The co-agglomeration index measures the strength of AE across industries. 
Plant-level data are required to compute Ellison-Glaeser indices. Following Guimarães et al. 
(2007), here we construct our indices using data from plant-counts
16. These authors show that 
plant-count data and the original Ellison-Glaeser versions of the index yield the same 
expected value. Besides, the variance of the index is smaller using plant-count data. We 
compute a 49×49 matrix of agglomeration and co-agglomeration indices. The element   
measures the strength of AE between firms of the m
th and n
th industries. If   then the co-
agglomeration index is just the agglomeration index for the m
th industry. These pair wise 
indices are computed using data from all continental Spanish municipalities for the year 2002. 
We propose the following measure of the strength of AE in municipality i: 
n m, γ
n m =





i i n m p
, ) , ( γ γ                                               [15] 
                                                 
14 Note that our analysis is restricted to municipalities with at least 1,000 inhabitants. We do not have 
information on all municipalities in 1995 with a population between 1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. 
Therefore we undertake a comparison between 1996 and 2002. 
15  Note that an industry which comprises a small number of plants will necessarily be highly 
concentrated spatially. 
16 This implies that: 1) the share of plants in each industry is used instead of the share of employment 
in each industry; 2.) the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index for each industry is replaced by 1 over the sum 
of plants in each industry. 
  17where   stands for the probability that on drawing two employees randomly from 
municipality i, one will belong to industry m and the other to industry n. The probability 
 can be written as: 
) , ( n m pi
) n , (m pi













n m p ) , (                                              [16] 
where  empim and empin denote the employment levels of the m
th and n
th industry in 
municipality i. Note that  i γ  captures the extent to which industries (and pairs of industries) 
with high AE are over-represented in a municipality. 
Dissimilarity between jurisdiction i  and its neighbors: Testable predictions 1 and 2 
imply that the effect of AE on the sensitivity of economic activity to taxes depends crucially 
on the way in which jurisdiction i relates to its neighbors in terms of size. We consider two 
municipalities to be neighbors if they belong to the same local labor market
17. The proposed 
measure of dissimilarity between municipality i and its neighbors is: 













μ                                                 [17] 
where   is the number of municipalities that constitute local labor market l and   and   
are the shares of municipalities i and j in the employment of local labor market l. Hence, 
expression [16] is the expected difference in employment shares between municipality i and a 
jurisdiction drawn randomly from its local labor market
l N i s j s
18. 
In Catalonia, and elsewhere, the municipality size distribution is highly skewed to the 
right. Hence, our dissimilarity measure,  i μ , will typically be high for the largest municipality 
in the local labor market which often acts as a central business district. For the remaining 
municipalities the dissimilarity measure will typically be low. This is so because small 
municipalities, as opposed to their larger counterparts, tend to have many neighbors that are 
                                                 
17 The local labour markets to which we refer have been computed by Roca and Moix (2004). 
Municipalities are aggregated in groups according to commuting considerations. Broadly speaking, 
each local labour market is built to ensure people live and work within its boundaries. Thus, the 946 
municipalities make up 41 local labour markets. With this level of aggregation, approximately 75% of 
the people live and work in the same local labour market. 
18 We have used other variables to capture dissimilarity in terms of size. For instance, we have 
computed expected differences in employment levels instead of differences in employment shares. We 
have also used other notions of geographic neighborhood (inverse distance weighting instead of using 
the binary notion of belonging to the same local labor market). The results obtained when using these 
alternative measures of dissimilarity remain largely unchanged. 
  18similar in size. Hence, although economic activities are highly concentrated in space, most 
jurisdictions compete with many similarly sized neighbors. 
3.3.-Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates. 
Endogeneity is the main econometric concern when estimating the effect of local taxes 
on the location of economic activities. More specifically, we are particularly concerned that 
shocks in employment might be correlated to changes in tax rates, given that municipal 
authorities may alter these rates in response to shocks in municipal employment. Suppose a 
left-wing mayor sees that a large plant abandons her municipality. She may then come under 
some pressure to cut taxes and she may do so which implies that  0 ) , cov( 3 ≠ − it it τ ε . Hence, 
3 − − ≡ it it it u ε ε  may be correlated to  it τ Δ  and OLS estimates of the effects of taxes on 
employment growth may be biased
19. One way to attenuate this endogeneity bias is to 
introduce controls for the different shocks that might affect municipalities within the region 
asymmetrically. In order to control for shocks that may be specific to small geographic areas 
within the region, we introduce  × year local labor market fixed effects. From a conceptual 
point of view, this step is highly significant to our analysis. Note that the inclusion of these 
fixed effects amounts to exploit the variation in tax rates that arises within local labor 
markets. This fits with our notion that neighboring jurisdictions compete more intensely over 
tax bases. Municipalities in which industries experiencing decline are over-represented may 
experience little growth. To control for industry mix related shocks we construct the 
following variable: 


























int η                                           [18] 
which is no more than the employment growth that municipality i would experience if every 
industry in i grew at the same rate as that experienced by the industry at the regional level. 
Finally, we also introduce the initial employment level to capture mean reverting behavior.  
Although these controls can explain a considerable degree of variation in employment 
growth across municipalities, their inclusion as control variables is not likely to eliminate the 
endogeneity bias completely. However, note that our main object of interest is not the average 
                                                 
19 Note that  3 − it ε  is, in principle, uncorrelated to  3 − it τ  since the latter is set at the end of  4 − it τ . 
  19effect of taxes. This enables us to take a difference-in-difference sort of approach. Recall our 
baseline econometric specification
20: 
                         it it it it it it it it u emp + ⋅ ⋅ Δ ⋅ + ⋅ Δ ⋅ + Δ ⋅ = Δ − − − 3 3 3 3 2 1 ) ln( μ γ τ β γ τ β τ β                  [19] 
Note that we can right the linear projection of   onto the observables in equation [19] in 
error form as: 
it u
                                 it it it it it it it it u υ μ γ τ δ γ τ δ τ δ + ⋅ ⋅ Δ ⋅ + ⋅ Δ ⋅ + Δ ⋅ = − − − 3 3 3 3 2 1                         [20] 
where  it υ  is an error term. If we plug expression [20] into [19] we obtain: 
              it it it it it it it it emp υ μ γ τ δ β γ τ δ β τ δ β + ⋅ ⋅ Δ ⋅ + + ⋅ Δ ⋅ + + Δ ⋅ + = Δ − − − 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln(       [21] 
Note that  it υ  is uncorrelated to all variables in this equation by construction. Hence, unbiased 
estimates of  2 β  and  3 β  can be obtained through an OLS regression of equation [21] as long 
as  0 2 = δ  and  0 3 = δ . Hence, our identifying assumption is that governments change tax rates 
according to shocks in employment regardless of the values that the AE and dissimilarity 
measures take. Given the possibility that the AE and dissimilarity measures ( 3 − it γ  and  3 − it μ ) 
may be correlated to employment shocks,  , it is necessary to check that OLS estimates of 
equation [21] are robust to the inclusion of 
it u
− it 3 γ  and  3 3 − − ⋅ it it μ γ  as separate control variables. 
OLS results: In Table 2 we present the OLS estimates of the equation in which we are 
interested. Both the agglomeration and the dissimilarity measures have been standardized to a 
mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one. All estimations include  × year local labor 
market fixed effects. Specifications [2], [3] and [4] include the employment level at the base 
year. Specifications [3] and [4] also include the variable measuring industry mix shocks, i.e. 
it η . Specification [4] includes additionally  3 − it γ  and  3 3 − − ⋅ it it μ γ  as separate control variables. 
In all specifications, F-tests of year× local labor market vs. year effects reject the hypothesis 
that fixed effects do not vary across local labor markets for a given year. The employment 
level at the base year is found to exert a negative effect on municipal employment growth. In 
its turn, the variable measuring the industry mix shock for municipality i,  it η  is statistically 
significant and takes the expected sign and order of magnitude. The control variab 3 − it les γ  
3 − it and  3 − ⋅ it μ γ  are jointly not significantly different from zero. In light of these results, we 
                                                 
20 For the sake of simplicity we do not include a constant term (or any local labor market dummies) or 
the other controls in equations [19], [20] and [21]. Our argument also holds when these variables are 
included. 
  20consider specification [3] to be our preferred specification. Note, however, that our results 
regarding the effects of taxes do not undergo any significant changes across specifications. 
 
Table 2. The effects of changes in tax rates on changes in employment (in logs). 
Changes defined over a three-year period. Pooled observations from 1995-1998 & 
1999-2002. OLS estimates. 
Variable  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
i) Intertwined effects of local taxes and AE 
-0.298 -0.300 -0.238  -0.256 
it τ Δ  
(-1.587) (-1.597) (-1.292)  (-1.359) 
-0.516 -0.519 -0.385  -0.431 






0.279 0.274 0.257  0.256 






ii) Controls        
-0.014 -0.016 -0.015  Employmentt-3 (×10




0.496 0.528  Industry mix shock   -.- -.-  (2.619)
*** (2.473)
** 
Local labor market dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 3 3    & − − − ⋅ it it it μ γ γ   No No No Yes 
1.637 1.577 1.442 1.433  F-test of Significance of Local 
labor market shocks  [0.001] [0.003] [0.013] [0.014] 
Wald test for: 
0   3 3 3 = ⋅ = − − − it it it μ γ γ   -.- -.- -.-  0.210 
[0.813] 
R
2  0.189 0.183 0.193 0.197 
No. Observations  675 675 675 675 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 2.
*,
**,
*** denotes significance at 1, 
5 and 10% level. Figures within brackets are p-values.  
 
As explained above, the OLS estimate of  1 β , measuring the average effect of a rise in 
taxes, is most likely to be biased. Hence, we focus here on the interaction terms between taxes 
and the AE and dissimilarity measures. Most importantly,  3 β  is positive and statistically 
different from zero. This is consistent with testable predictions 1 and 2 above. Given the point 
estimates of  2 β  (-0.385) and  3 β  (0.257) obtained in specification [3], we can obtain the 
threshold that solves  0 3 2 = ⋅ + 3 − it μ β β . This threshold is 1.5. This implies that AE reduce the 
effect of taxes if  3 − it μ  is, at least, 1.5 standard deviations larger than the mean. The opposite is 
the case for dissimilarity levels below this threshold. Around 14% of our sample shows a 
  21dissimilarity measure above 1.5 standard deviations. This implies that for most of our sample 
stronger AE imply the more marked effect of taxes. This can be explained by the fact that 
most municipalities are small and generally compete with many similarly sized neighbors. 
3.4.-Instrumental variables (IV) estimates. 
Obtaining a reliable estimate of the average effect of tax rate changes on employment 
growth, i.e.  1 β , is interesting in itself but, above all, it enables us to place the estimates of  2 β  
and  3 β  in context. That is, in order to know the extent to which AE influence the effect of 
taxes, we need an estimate of the average effect of the variable of interest. This calls for an 
instrumental variables approach which requires some exogenous variation in local business 
tax rates. 
Instruments: The source of exogenous variation we rely on comes from a particular 
institutional characteristic of Spain’s local business tax: namely, that there are legal limits on 
maximum tax rates which vary across municipalities discretely according to population size 
(See section 3.2 and Figure 5). Here, we aim at using the maximum tax rate as an instrumental 
variable for the tax rate change. 
The first requirement an instrumental variable has to satisfy is that it must shift the 
variable of interest. Data on local business tax rates present two important features in this 
respect, highlighted above in section 3.2. First, the share of municipalities whose maximum 
tax rate is binding is not low (30-40% range). Second, local business tax rates increased 
during the period 1995-2002. As a result, the share of municipalities whose maximum tax rate 
is binding also increased during this same period (from 32% to 42%). For most municipalities 
with binding maximum tax rates, the decision to change tax rates is obviously a constrained 
one. Hence, maximum tax rates are very likely to determine in part tax rate choices as well as 
their changes. For non-binding municipalities, maximum tax rates can partly determine tax 
setting behavior, too. For instance, municipal governments may be reluctant to choose the 
maximum tax rate level, or one which is too close to it, since this leaves them with no room 
for maneuver in case of future budget difficulties. Hence, the assumption that maximum tax 
rates shift tax rate changes seems a plausible one. Note that this is a testable assumption and 
one that we examine below. 
The second requirement for an instrumental variable is that it should be uncorrelated to 
the error term. In our case this means that maximum tax rates should be uncorrelated to 
shocks in employment growth. Maximum tax rates are not exogenous since they vary with 
  22population size. However, we claim that maximum tax rates are uncorrelated to shocks in 
employment growth conditional on the employment level in the base year, year×local labor 
market fixed effects and our variable capturing industry mix related shocks. Our maintained 
assumption is that these controls will absorb any correlation between population size and 
shocks in employment growth. 
The maximum tax rate may not be the only instrumental variable this particular 
institutional set-up may generate. For instance, another candidate instrument is the distance to 
the maximum tax rate ( ). It is reasonable to think that it is this distance and not the 
maximum tax rate itself that determines the tax rate setting behavior. However, a gain in 
terms of increasing the capacity to shift taxes may come at the cost of decreasing our 
confidence that the instrument is uncorrelated to shocks in employment. Suppose that shocks 
in employment are serially correlated, i.e. 
3 − − it
Max
it τ τ
0 ) , cov( 1 ≠ − it it ε ε . A negative shock in   may 
lead to a tax increase in   and hence 
4 − t
3 − t 3 − it τ  may be correlated to  3 − it ε  if  0 cov( 4 ) , 3 ≠ − it − it ε ε . 
Thus   may not be a valid instrument in the sense that it can be correlated to  3 − − it
Max
it τ τ
3 − − it it ≡ it u ε ε  through  4 − it ε . However, we can use the interaction term between the distance 





it ⋅ − ) 3
− − it τ
Max
it τ . The idea is that 
left-wing governments set higher tax rates than their right-wing counterparts. In fact, the share 
of left-wing governments whose maximum tax rates are binding is remarkably higher. In 
1999, this share was 42% for left-wing governments and 25% for right-wing governments. 
Hence, conditional on a given distance to the maximum ( ) being a left-wing 
government may generate an extra boost in terms of expected tax rate increases which can be 
considered to be uncorrelated to shocks in employment growth. 
Instrumental variables results: We now turn to the data to assess the degree to which: 1) 
The instrument shifts the endogenous variable (the model is identified); 2) There are any 
grounds to suspect that the instruments are correlated with the error term. We focus this 
discussion on estimating an average effect of tax rate increases on employment growth. That 
is, we leave out, for the time being, the interaction terms between tax rate changes and the AE 
and dissimilarity measures. Columns 1 and 3 report first and second stage estimates when the 
only excluded instrument used is the maximum tax rate ( ). Columns 2 and 4 report the 
Max
it τ
                                                 
21 By left-wing government we refer to governments whose mayor belongs to the Socialist Party 
(PSC/PSOE) or the Green Party (IC/IU). The share of left-wing governments was 34% in Dec. 1995-
Dec. 1998 and fell to 27% in Dec. 1999-Dec. 2002 
  23results obtained when both   and the interaction term   are used as 
excluded instruments. 
Max
it τ left it
Max
it ⋅ − − ) ( 3 τ τ
 
Table 3. The effects of changes in tax rates on changes in employment (in logs). 
Changes defined over a three-year period. Pooled observations from 1995-1998 & 
1999-2002. Instrumental variables estimates. 
  First-Stage 
Regression  2SLS Estimates  OLS 
Estimates 
i) Tax rates changes and instruments 
-0.973 -0.887 -0.108 




0.165 0.114  MAX
it τ   (6.649)
*** (4.347)
***  -.- -.- -.- 
0.148  Left it
MAX
it ⋅ − − ) ( 3 τ τ   -.-  (3.400)
***  -.- -.- -.- 
ii ) Controls        












Local labor market 
dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
iii) Identification and instrument validity statistics 
Partial R
2  0.081 0.128  -.-  -.-  -.- 
F-test of excluded 
instruments 
44.21 
  [0.000] 
23.63 
  [0.000]  -.- -.- -.- 
Hansen J Statistic  -.- -.- -.-  0.186 
[0.666]  -.- 
Included instruments  -.- -.- 
MAX
it τ  
MAX






− − ) ( 3 τ τ
 
-.- 
No. Observations  675 675 675 675 675 
           Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 2.
*,
**,
*** denotes significance  
 at 1, 5 and 10% level. 2. Figures within brackets are p-values.  
 
First-stage regression results show that both the maximum tax rate,   and the 
interaction term (  are statistically significant determinants of tax rate 
changes. The F-test of excluded instruments takes a value which is above 20 in both cases
Max
it τ
left ⋅ ) 3 it
Max
it − − τ τ
22. 
Hence, the instruments proposed seem to shift tax rate changes. Note that the partial R
2 
increases from 8 to 12% when including   as an excluded instrument.  left it
Max
it ⋅ − − ) ( 3 τ τ
                                                 
22 Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest, as a rule of thumb, that an F-test below 10 may be associated with 
weak instrument problems. 
  24We now turn to the second-stage results. The last column of the table shows the OLS 
results for comparative purposes. The 2SLS estimates of the effect of taxes on employment 
growth are negative and statistically different from zero. The effect is -0.973 when only   
is used and -0.887 when both   and   are used. This implies that a 
municipality that increases its business tax rate one standard deviation below the average 
increases municipal employment growth by approximately 5% over a three-year period. Note 
that the estimate obtained by OLS is -0.108 indicating the need for instrumental variables 
estimation. The assumption that the maximum tax rate is uncorrelated to employment shocks 
is not testable when only   is used as an instrument. However, when both   and 
 are used, a test of over-identifying restrictions can be computed. The 





it τ left it
Max







it ⋅ − − ) ( 3 τ τ
Thus, we obtained OLS estimates for the interaction terms between local taxes and AE 
which are unbiased under plausible assumptions in section 3.3 and, above, we also obtained 
an instrumental variables estimate of an average effect of local taxes on employment growth. 
We now aim at obtaining joint estimates of all these parameters. A conservative approach 
would be to instrument all variables containing tax rate changes, i.e.,  it τ Δ ,  3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  and 
3 3 − − ⋅ ⋅ Δ it it it μ γ τ . Instruments for the interaction terms are simply obtained by interacting  3 − it γ  
and  3 3 − − ⋅ it it μ γ  with instruments   and
23 Max
it τ left it
Max
it ⋅ − − ) ( 3 τ τ . The results of this exercise are 











                                                 
23 The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic provided by the Stata command ivreg2 rejects the hypothesis 
that the model is unidentified. Note that the F-test of excluded instruments can be misleading in the 
case where several variables are endogenous. 
  25Table 4. The effects of changes in tax rates on changes in employment (in logs). 
Changes defined over a three-year period. Pooled observations from 1995-1998 & 
1999-2002. Instrumental variables estimates. 
 [1]  [2]  [3] 
i) Intertwined effects of local taxes and AE 
-0.886 -0.886 -0.863 





-0.336 -0.336 -0.375 
3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  
(-0.704) (0.717)  (-2.245)
** 
0.151 0.151 0.224 




Ii ) Controls     










Local labor market dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
iii) Instrumented variables 
it τ Δ   Yes -.-  Yes 
3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  &  3 3 − − ⋅ ⋅ Δ it it it μ γ τ   Yes -.-  No 
iv) Hausman Endogeneity test  
0.708  ≡ 1 v it τ Δ   -.-  (1.438)  -.- 
≡ 2 v   3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ   -.-  -0.186 
(-0.384)  -.- 
≡ 3 v 3 3 − − ⋅ ⋅ Δ it it it μ γ τ   -.-  0.122 
(0.977)  -.- 
3.41  Wald-test  0 3 2 1 = = = v v v   -.-  [0.017]  -.- 
0.48  Wald-test  0 3 2 = = v v   -.-  [0.618]  -.- 
No. Observations  675 675  675 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 2.
*,
**,
*** denotes significance at 
1, 5 and 10% level. 2. Figures within brackets are p-values. 3. Excluded instruments are 
and   and their interactions with 
MAX
it τ Left it
MAX
it ⋅ − − ) ( 3 τ τ 3 − it γ  &  3 3 − − ⋅ it it μ γ  in all 
regressions. 4.-Upper-bar variables denote first stage fitted values. 
 
Note that the estimate we obtain for  1 β  (-0.886), which measures the effect of a tax 
change for a municipality with average AE and dissimilarity measures, is very similar to the 
estimate obtained when the AE and dissimilarity measures were left out of the analysis (See 
Table 3). Note, too, that the estimates of the interactions terms  3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  and  3 3 − − ⋅ ⋅ Δ it it it μ γ τ  
are similar to those obtained by OLS estimation (See specification [3] in Table 2). Note, 
however, that instrumental variables comes at the cost of an important loss in terms of 
  26efficiency. In the second Column of Table 4, we report the regression-based results of the 
Hausman test
24. This test is performed in three steps. First, each endogenous variable ( it τ Δ , 
3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  and  3 3 − − ⋅ ⋅ Δ it it it μ γ τ ) is regressed on all exogenous variables by OLS and errors are 
computed (v1, v2 and v3). Second, these errors are included as additional variables in an OLS 
regression of the equation of interest. Note that the coefficients are then identical to the 2SLS 
estimates (compare the first and the second columns in Table 4)
25. Third, the test on the 
endogeneity of a set of regressors is computed as a simple Wald test on the joint significance 
of the appropriate first-stage errors (the v’s). As expected, the hypothesis that none of the 
variables containing tax rate increases, i.e.  it τ Δ ,  3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  or  3 3 − − ⋅ ⋅ Δ it it it μ γ τ , is endogenous 
is rejected. However, the hypothesis that none of the interaction terms, i.e.  3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  and 
3 3 − ⋅ ⋅ Δ it it − it μ γ τ  is endogenous, cannot be rejected. This suggests that our difference-in-
difference sort of approach taken in section 3.3 is not problematic. In the last column of Table 
4, we present the estimates obtained when only  it τ Δ  is instrumented. Notice that the point 
estimates do not experience significant changes but that the standard errors do, to a large 
extent, fall. We use this last specification to get a grasp of the quantitative importance of AE 
on the effects of taxes. 
The estimate obtained for a municipality with average AE and dissimilarity measures is 
-0.863 in this last specification. The estimates of the interaction terms between tax rate 
changes and our AE and dissimilarity measures are -0.375 for the interaction term  3 − ⋅ Δ it it γ τ  
and 0.224 for the interaction term  ⋅ Δ 3 − 3 − ⋅ it it μ γ it τ . This indicates that the effect of taxes 
varies significantly around the mean. The coefficient of variation of the municipal-specific 
point estimate of the effect of taxes on employment growth,  , is 39%. To illustrate the 
extent of this variation, note that one standard deviation increase (decrease) in the AE 
measure, increases (decreases) the effect of taxes around 43%, i.e. the effect is -1.23 (-0.49), 
for a municipality with an average dissimilarity measure. 
i β ˆ
3.5.-Robustness analysis. 
We decided to make some additional estimations so as to discard the possibility that our 
results are driven by other explanations. First, due to the skewness of the municipality size 
distribution our dissimilarity measure,  i μ , is positively correlated to municipality size. 
Bucovetzky (1991) points out that the tax base of a large municipality is less elastic to tax rate 
                                                 
24 See Wooldridge (2002), pp. 118-122. 
25 Note that the standard errors are not the same. The 2SLS are the correct ones. 
  27changes. This could, in principle, be responsible for our result whereby AE lower the effect of 
taxes for municipalities that are very dissimilar in size to their neighbors. As a robustness 
check, we constructed interaction terms of tax rate changes and employment size (both in 
levels and in shares for the appropriate local labor market). These interactions were not 
statistically significant and their introduction had no effect on our estimates of interest. Thus, 
our results do not simply identify an asymmetric competition story in which big cities are less 
affected by the adverse effects of taxes than the smaller ones, regardless of the level of AE.  
Second, in Spain, some traditional manufactures that have experienced decline in the 
last few decades (e.g. textiles) show high AE measured by the Ellison-Glaeser agglomeration 
index (1997). It might be the case that taxes have greater effects on declining industries. This 
could, in part, explain why AE led to greater effects of taxes for most of our sample. Our 
results are nevertheless robust to the inclusion of an interaction term between tax rate changes 
and the variable measuring industry mix shocks,  it η . Hence, an association between industries 
with high AE and industries in decline does not seem to drive our results, either. 
 
4.-Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to shed additional light on the effect of AE on the 
sensitivity of economic activities to taxes using Spanish data at the municipal level. This 
empirical set-up has determined the sort of agglomeration economies that we considered here, 
Marshallian AE, as opposed to other mechanisms operating at larger geographic scales (e.g. 
market-access and cost-of-living effects). We first analyzed, at the theoretical level, the 
impact of Marshallian AE on the role of taxes in shaping the allocation of economic 
activities. We found that stronger AE led to increased tax effects, if the jurisdictions were 
relatively similar in size. When this was not the case, stronger AE led to a reduction in the 
effect of taxes.  
We then conducted an empirical analysis using a panel of municipalities from the 
Spanish region of Catalonia for the period 1995-2002. The policy instrument we focused on 
was a municipal tax on business. There exists a maximum tax rate that varies across 
municipalities with population discretely. This institutional feature can be used to produce 
instrumental variable estimates of the effects of tax rate changes on municipal employment 
growth. To assess the empirical validity of the predictions derived in the theoretical analysis 
we constructed: 1) A variable capturing the extent to which industries with high AE are over-
  28represented in a municipality; 2) A variable capturing the extent to which a municipality is 
dissimilar to its neighbors in terms of size. Our empirical strategy relied on estimating 
interaction terms between these measures and tax rates changes. 
We found that an increase in the variable capturing the strength of AE in municipality i 
implies an increase in the effects of taxes if this jurisdiction is relatively similar in size to its 
neighbors. The opposite was true for municipalities which were sufficiently dissimilar in size 
to their neighbors. Hence, our empirical findings provide evidence supporting the results 
obtained in the theoretical analysis. For most municipalities, stronger AE imply a more 
marked effect of taxes. Only in 14% of the municipalities contained in our sample - those that 
are most dissimilar to their neighbors in terms of size - did stronger AE imply a less marked 
effect of taxes. This may be explained by the fact that the municipality size distribution is 
highly skewed to the right. Hence, most municipalities may compete with many neighbors of 
a similar size. By contrast, the largest municipality in a local labor market, which generally 
acts as the central business district, is generally very different in size to its neighbors. For 
such a municipality, AE may lower the effects of taxes since firms may be less willing to 
move out in exchange for a lower tax bill. Note that our results imply that the effect of AE on 
the sensitivity of economic activities to taxes may be very context specific. Our results also 
suggest that the effect of taxes varies significantly across municipalities, reflecting different 
values of the AE and dissimilarity measures. The coefficient of variation of the municipal-
specific point estimate of the effect of taxes on employment growth,  , was 39%. Thus, 
while all the municipalities should be afraid, to some degree, of losing tax bases because of 
mobility, those hosting highly agglomerated industries and having a relatively small share of 
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A.1.  For expression [7] to be positive, its denominator should be positive assuming that 
1 < A τ . This can only be the case if  . Since  , it 
follows that 
)) ( 2 /( ) 1 (
2
A A E E − ⋅ − > α γ 4 ) /( 1
2 ≥ − A A E E
) 1 ( 2 α γ − ⋅ > . But note that this cannot be the case in a stable and diversified 
equilibrium since for this equilibrium regime to arise  ) 1 ( 2 α γ − ⋅ <  has to hold. Hence, 
expression [7] is always negative in the diversified equilibrium regime. 
A.2.  An increase in the strength of AE increases the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax 
differentials as long as this inequality holds: 
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In any symmetric stable equilibrium this is the case given that  2 1 0 = ⋅ − A E .
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that  EA > e manipulations are required. Given that 2 is a 
negative term in any stable equilibrium, expression [A.1] can be written as: 
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and after re-arranging terms this can be re-written as: 
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E E
 does not depend on any parameter. Besides, it turns out 
that it goes from 4 to - ∞ as   goes from   to 1. Hence, for any parameter configuration 
such that 
A E 2 1/
γ α > − ⋅ ) 1 ( 2 , there is always some   which is close enough to   such that this 
inequality holds. Hence, if the distribution of entrepreneurs is sufficiently even, an increase in 
the strength of AE increases the sensitivity to tax differentials on the part of entrepreneurs. 
A E 2 1/
Likewise, an increase in the strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to 
tax differentials as long as this inequality holds: 
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which can be written as: 

























γ                                           [A.5] 
When the allocation of entrepreneurs in jurisdiction A exceeds a threshold, 
12 / 1 2 / 1 + > A E , then  1
) ( 2










. Hence, the right hand side of equation [A.8] 
becomes negative and, as a result, inequality [A.5] holds. Hence, if entrepreneurs are 
sufficiently concentrated in jurisdiction A, an increase in the strength of AE reduces the 
sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials.  
We have shown that an increase in the strength of AE increases the sensitivity of 
entrepreneurs to tax differentials for any   which is close enough to  . We have found 
otherwise for any   which is close enough to 1. Since 
A E 2 / 1
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strictly decreasing for all  , then there must be some threshold value   such that for 
any   inequality [A.1] holds and for any   inequality [A.4] holds. 
2 / 1 > A E A E ˆ
A A E E ˆ 2 / 1 < ≤ 1 ˆ < < A A E E
A.3.- In the concentrated case, the fact that  12 / 1 2 / 1 + > A E  also guarantees that an increase 
in the strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials by virtue of 
expression [A.5]. For values such that  12 / 1 2 / 1 + < A E  it turns out that  1
) ( 2









hence it is not clear whether equation [A.5] holds. Given a configuration of parameters, the 
smallest   for which a concentrated equilibrium can be stable,  A E
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Expression [A.5] can be re-expressed as: 
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When this inequality is evaluated at   it yields: 
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 for all  . Hence, given any configuration of parameters, for any  , it follows  A E 0 > A E
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that equation [A.6] has to hold. Thus, in any concentrated stable equilibrium, an increase in 
the strength of AE reduces the sensitivity of entrepreneurs to tax differentials. 
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